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riddles that arise in practical experience, or it should not be announced as any more closely related to teaching than an interesting book on any other science.

Such criticisms as these are forestalled by the author in his preface by the frank avowal 'that the text is much more descriptive than explanatory; that a constant appeal is made to the experience of the student to verify the statements of the text; that the matter presented is largely concrete and little abstract.' As a brief descriptive text, it is very suggestive; as a concrete statement of a number of facts about mental life, it is not unsuccessful. Whether the appeal to the student's experience is direct when made by way of text-book statements of parallel experiences, is the question raised in the critical remarks offered in the foregoing paragraphs.

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NEW BOOKS

Bergson, H. *L'évolution créatrice*. Paris: Felix Alcan. 1907. Pp. viii + 403.

Blewett, George John. *The Study of Nature and the Vision of God: With Other Essays in Philosophy*. Toronto: William Briggs. 1907. Pp. ix + 358.

James, William. *Pragmatism*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co. 1907. Pp. xiii + 309. \$1.25 net.

Volkelt, Johannes. *Die Quellen der Menschlichen Gewissheit*. Munich: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. 1906. Pp. 134. 3.50 M.

NOTES AND NEWS

THE following summary of a paper on 'Intuition' read by Mr. A. T. Shearman before the Aristotelian Society on May 6, is from the *Athenæum*: "There is a two-fold part played by intuition in philosophical researches. The process is employed, firstly, at the commencement of philosophy, where there is intuition of certain individual facts and of certain general propositions; and secondly, in the selection of a method of treating these data. It is because intuition is thus employed that there exist so many differences between thought systems. Future philosophical work may proceed along the lines that have hitherto been followed, or there may be combination among thinkers. The latter procedure would be likely to produce more satisfaction than the former. Satisfaction to human minds is the only test of the value of a philosophical system. The more intense and widespread the satisfaction, the nearer, it may be hoped—but not proved—is the system to the truth. A system reached by means of cooperation may well give place in the future to another, since the group of intuitions that form the starting-point for the combining experts may be characterized by incompleteness or by error; and in any case intuitions of the truth of general propositions change with successive generations of men. Owing to the position

of intuition in philosophy, discussion can never lead a man to adopt another's ultimates. Clear and accurate statement of premises, method and conclusions is alone useful to effect such adoption. Exhortation would be always useless and sometimes dishonest. The subjective self can not be intuited. To say that such self observes itself, but not as an object, is to rob the word 'observation' of all connotation. When we say that the self is observed we are speaking of the objective self. The subjective self is known indirectly, its existence being involved in the existence of pleasure and pain and of attention. Not that we feel the act of attention; those who hold that we do are really referring to a feeling of cerebral and neural strains. Dr. Stout's doctrine that we have 'immediate experience of felt tendency' involves us in a truism or in a doctrine which he rightly rejects, or else the existence of a known tendency is based merely upon the occurrence of pure feeling, a position which is clearly untenable. Not that we directly distinguish pleasure from pain, for we only distinguish the intellectual changes that are produced by such feeling. This view necessitates our adoption of the doctrine that the elements of sense-content are immediately perceived. Dr. Hicks rejects this doctrine, but his substitute would not allow of our *recognizing* a quality. His view is refutable on this ground, but not on the ground sometimes alleged, that, unless one had experience of contents immediately perceived, the denial of their existence would be impossible. The latter argument is invalid, for the utterance of an *A* proposition does not necessitate the experience of one of the objects referred to by the subject term. On the contrary, the class may be formed by means of intension, a process which sometimes is alone available, *e. g.*, in the formation of the null-class. The subjective self is thus an inference from certain presentational changes that can not be ascribed to physical stimuli, and Ward's view is justified. We can truly form an idea by means of constructive imagination of our own subjective self, but we can not intuit the identity that exists between the object corresponding to this idea and the subjective self that is involved in the formation of the idea. There may, however, be immediate direction of our attention to another subjective self; this, that is to say, may be among our presentations. Dr. Pikler affirms that it can not, but he is inconsistent in his use of the word 'presentation.' If we remember the function of intuition in philosophy, and the grounds of our assertion of the existence of the subjective self, the meaning of such statements as 'I know that I know myself' becomes clear, and some portions of the free-will problem are solved."

ACCORDING to the *Psychological Clinic*, "It is reported that the director of the Harvard Psychological Laboratory is about to make the laboratory useful in the direction of an examination and classification of the backward children of Cambridge."

AT Amherst College, Professor W. J. Newlin, associate professor of mathematics and psychology, has been appointed associate professor of philosophy. He will continue next year the work he has carried on since the death of Professor Garman.

PROFESSOR HEIBIG, the Danish philologist, has discovered a new manuscript of Archimedes at the Convent of the Holy Sepulchre at Constantinople. The treatise is said to give new information about the predecessors of Archimedes.

M. HENRI POINCARÉ, professor of mathematical astronomy at the University of Paris, has been appointed a member of the Council of the Teaching of Fine Arts, in the room of the late M. Berthelot.

FELIX ALCAN is to publish in the autumn the second volume of Jacques Bardoux's 'Essai d'une psychologie de l'Angleterre contemporaine,' dealing with such current phenomena as 'les crises politiques' and 'protectionnisme et radicalisme.'

THE publication board of Teachers College, Columbia University, are receiving subscriptions to promote the republication of the work by Dr. Sequin entitled 'Idiocy and its Treatment by the Physiological Method.'

THE *Revue de Philosophie* begins in the May number a careful summary of the lectures being delivered at the Sorbonne by M. E. Durkheim on topics in the history of religion.

JAMES MACLEHOSE & SONS, of Glasgow, are to publish a new history of Philosophy, by A. B. D. Alexander.

'MOTHER GOOSE, PH.D.,' contributed to the May *Century* by Mary Jessie Gidley, will no doubt prove interesting to the readers of the *Journal*. We therefore quote it in part:

A PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFICULTY

Little Miss Muffet
Sat on a tuffet,
Studying Hume for exam;
And she said, "I can't see,
If ideas are me,
Just exactly where all of me am!"

DISCUSSION

John Boyce would not read Royce;
His friend would not read James;
So they monized and they pragmatized,
And called each other names.

TWO SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY

Hickory, dickory, dock!
The pluralist looked at the clock;
The clock struck one,
And away he run;
Hickory, dickory, dock!

Hickory, dickory, do!
The monist looked also;
The clock struck ten,
And he looked again,
And said, "It is three hours slow!"